












Did the Credit Crunch in Japan 
Affect Household Welfare? 
An Augmented Euler Equation Approach 
Using Type 5 Tobit Model 
 
Yasuyuki Sawada 
University of Tokyo 
Kazumitsu Nawata   























CARF is presently supported by Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ, Ltd., Dai-ichi Mutual Life 
Insurance Company, Meiji Yasuda Life Insurance Company, Mizuho Financial Group, Inc., 
Nippon Life Insurance Company, Nomura Holdings, Inc. and Sumitomo Mitsui Banking 

















Working Papers are a series of manuscripts in their draft form.  They are not intended for 
circulation or distribution except as indicated by the author.  For that reason Working Papers may 
not be reproduced or distributed without the written consent of the author. Did the Credit Crunch in Japan Affect Household Welfare? 




Yasuyuki Sawada**, University of Tokyo, Japan 
Kazumitsu Nawata, University of Tokyo, Japan 
Masako Ii, Hitotsubashi University, Japan 




* The authors would like to thank the Institute for Research on Household Economics for 
providing their panel data and Prof. Takeshi Amemiya for encouraging them to work on this 
paper.  They also thank Naohito Abe, Tony Cavoli, Mototsugu Fukushige, Yoshio Higuchi, 
Charles Yuji Horioka, Takeo Hoshi, Yasushi Iwamoto, Miki Kohara, and Colin McKenzie, 
Masaya Sakuragawa, and Wako Watanabe for their helpful comments and Shunichiro Bessho 
for his excellent research assistance.  
 
**Corresponding author: Graduate School of Economics, University of Tokyo, 7-3-1 Hongo, 
Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo 113-0033, Japan. E-mail: sawada@e.u-tokyo.ac.jp 
 
   2
Abstract 
We investigate whether the credit crunch in Japan affected household welfare and the manner 
in which it did.  We augment the theoretical framework of a consumption Euler equation with 
endogenous credit constraints and estimate it with household panel data for 1993–1999, 
generating several empirical findings.  First, a small portion of the people faced credit 
constraints in Japan before and after the financial crisis in 1997.  Accordingly, our results reject 
the standard consumption Euler equation.  Second, the credit crunch affected household 
welfare negatively, albeit not seriously, after 1997.  Our results corroborate that the credit 
crunch in Japan was supply-driven.   
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1.  Introduction 
 
In Japan, the collapse of mega-banks in 1997 increased regulatory pressure, market 
scrutiny, and the distress of the financial system, thereby causing a crisis in the domestic 
financial sector (Woo, 2003).  The financial crisis in Japan is often referred to as a typical 
example of a “credit crunch,” which is conventionally defined as a sharp decline in bank loans 
caused by supply factors such as risk-based capital standards imposed on banks.
1 There is a 
large emerging body of studies that questions whether the credit crunch in Japan constrained 
firm investments, and if so, the manner in which it did so.  However, the derived empirical 
results are different, ranging from no evidence of a credit crunch to clear evidence of a crunch 
in 1997 or even earlier (Caballero, Hoshi, and Kashyap, 2006; Hayashi and Prescott, 2002; 
Hori, Saito, and Ando, 2006; Hosono, 2006; Ito and Sasaki, 2002; Motonishi and Yoshikawa, 
1999; Woo, 2003).
2  
However, there are no clear explanations for the manner in which the financial crisis 
and credit crunch affected the welfare of Japanese households.
3  Casual evidence shows that 
the negative impact of the credit crunch in Japan was serious at the household level; for 
example, the growth rate of the credit supply of private banks to individuals shrunk 
                                                 
1 However, such a crunch can also be caused by a slump in demand. 
2 For example, Peek and Rosengren (2000) indicate that the credit crunch in Japan became a 
serious issue even around 1993, by finding that Japanese banks reduced their commercial real 
estate lending in the US where the financial crisis in Japan was an external event.  Ito and 
Sasaki (2002) corroborate this view.  In contrast, Woo (2003) finds empirical support for only 
the credit crunch experienced in 1997. 
3 Kang and Sawada (2007) examine the manner in which the credit crunch in Korea affected 
household welfare in 1997 and 1998.    4
significantly in the 1990s and even became negative in 1992 and 1993 (Ogawa, 2003).  In 
addition, the number of applications for individual bankruptcies jumped from 43,545 in 1993 
to 122,741 in 1999 (Figure 1).  Thus, it is natural to hypothesize that this sharp increase in 
individual bankruptcies was caused by the problems in the financial sector.  There are many 
newspaper articles reporting that the credit crunch in Japan damaged small firms 
disproportionately because unlike large listed firms, the only source of their external funding 
for investments was still bank loans.  Accordingly, it has been said that many owners of small 
firms or businesses went bankrupt after facing a steep decline in bank loans during the credit 
crunch.  Although this credit crunch can be assumed to have negatively affected the welfare of 
small-firm owners and their employees, it is not categorically clear whether the credit crunch 
really affected small firms disproportionately.  For example, Hayashi and Prescott (2002) 
concluded that small firms could rely on their own cash and deposits to weather the sharp 
decline in bank loans.  Moreover, the negative impact on employment was actually smaller 
than the original prediction; further, it was not comparable to the impact of other major 
economic crises such as the Great Depression (Genda, 2003; Hoshi, 2006).  The responses of 
firms, households, and the government appeared to have played important roles in coping with 
the macroeconomic crisis.  Hence, unless a thorough empirical study is undertaken, the overall 
social impact of the credit crunch is not necessarily clear.  
By addressing the extent to which households were affected by the crisis, this study 
aims to overcome the shortcoming in the existing studies; we achieve this by providing more 
information on the Japanese financial crisis.  In our empirical analysis, household-level panel 
data collected from 1993 to 1999 are used.  We estimate a consumption Euler equation that is 
augmented by endogenously imposed credit constraints using a switching regression or Type 5 
Tobit model.  The methodology permits us to derive a density function of the probabilities of 
binding credit constraints for each year, which makes it possible to quantify the seriousness of 
the credit crunch at the household level.    5
In order to identify whether the credit crunch was driven by supply or demand, we also 
estimate Kimball’s prudence parameter (1990) before and during the credit crunch using the 
approach suggested by Lee and Sawada (2007); this approach is an extension of the Euler 
equation approach proposed by Dynan (1993).  A change in the prudence parameter 
characterizes a change in households’ saving behavior and thus indicates the demand for credit.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 provides a theoretical 
framework based on which the econometric framework is derived in Section 3.  Section 4 
presents a discussion of the data and empirical results, and Section 5 concludes the paper.  
 
2.  The Model Framework 
 
Under the financial crisis, households faced the problem of reconciling realized income 
shortfall with a desirable level of stable consumption.  This problem can be theoretically 
captured as a problem of intertemporal consumption smoothing under a stochastic income 
process.  Households have devised several methods, such as those involving self-insurance and 
mutual insurance, to cope with the ex-post risks of negative income shocks and to protect their 
levels of consumption.  
In this paper, we focus on a particular measure that households use to cope with 
hardship—credit.  Households can utilize credit to smooth consumption by reallocating future 
resources for current consumption.  The lack of consumption insurance can be compensated for 
by having access to a credit market (Eswaran and Kotwal, 1989).  However, households may 
be constrained from borrowing for a variety of reasons such as asymmetric information 
(Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981).  The existence of credit constraints has important negative impacts 
on the risk-coping ability of poor households.  For example, faced with a shortfall in the real 
income, credit-constrained households may be forced to reduce consumption expenditure since 
credit cannot be used as insurance.  A credit crunch could magnify this negative impact of   6
credit constraints.  This channel may explain the mechanisms of the so-called consumption 
slump and the resultant deflationary spirals in Japan (Krugman, 1998).  Interestingly, Olney 
(1999) also showed that, given the high cost of default, reducing consumption was the only 
viable strategy of American households against the recession in 1930.  Accordingly, consumer 
spending collapsed in 1930, turning a minor recession into the Great Depression.  While credit 
constraints were self-imposed by households in the case of the Great Depression, there appears 
to be a common element of reinforced credit constraints in recessions in the US and Japan.  
 
2.1 The Model of an Augmented Euler Equation 
In order to formalize the role of credit, following Zeldes (1989) and Deaton (1991), we 
construct a model that provides optimal consumer behavior under uncertain income and 
potential credit constraints.  Suppose a household i’s decision-maker has a concave 
instantaneous utility U(•) of the household consumption Ct.  The household then has to choose 
a value of Cit with a subjective discount rate δ such that the discounted lifetime utility is 
maximized, which is subject to intertemporal budget constraints with the interest rate r.  
Generally, when the household income is stochastic, analytical solutions to this problem cannot 
be derived (Zeldes, 1989).  However, in order to obtain an optimum solution, we can derive a 
set of first-order necessary conditions by forming a value function and a Bellman equation.  Let 
λ represent the Lagrange multiplier associated with credit constraint A + y – C + z ≥ 0 where A 
is the household asset at the beginning of the period, y represents the stochastic household 
income, and the maximum amount of credit possible for this household is represented by z.
4   
                                                 
4 When z is sufficiently large, the household can lend and borrow freely at a rate of interest r.  
A case of complete borrowing constraint, in which a household cannot borrow at all, can be 
represented by z = 0.   7
On combining the envelope condition derived from the first-order conditions, we obtain 
a consumption Euler equation that is augmented by the possibility of a binding credit 
constraint:  
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2.2 Measuring Welfare Losses from Binding Credit Constraints 
This augmented Euler equation (1) was first derived by Zeldes (1989).  The term λ is 
equal to the increase in the expected lifetime utility that would result if the current constraint 
were relaxed by one unit.  Since the household is constrained from borrowing more, but not 
from saving more, λ assumes a positive sign.  Accordingly, we can interpret the Lagrange 
multiplier  λ as an indicator of the negative welfare effects generated by binding credit 
constraints (Kang and Sawada, 2007).  Note that the Lagrange multiplier λit is a negative 
function of the current income yit.  Given other variables, an increase in the current income of a 
credit-constrained household leads to a decline in the marginal utility of current consumption, 
thereby causing the Lagrange multiplier to decline.  This theoretical property provides us with 
a basis for testing the validity of the theoretical framework. 
 
3.  Econometric Framework 
 
Our econometric framework aims to test the implications of the augmented Euler 
equation (1).  Here, we employ two different empirical strategies.  First, following Zeldes 
(1989), we suppose that households form their rational expectations and that utility is described 
by the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function, i.e.,   8
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γ − − − = , where θ   represents the household size and tastes.  Then, 
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where Ĉ is the consumption growth rate, and e denotes the household’s expectation error with 
E(eit+1|It), with It being the information set available at time t.  
The second approach follows the approach adopted by Lee and Sawada (2007), which 
is an extension of Dynan (1993), by including endogenous credit constraints.  As shown by Lee 
and Sawada (2007), we can take a second-order Taylor approximation of equation (1) to obtain  
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where ρ ≡ - C(U”’/U”) is the coefficient of relative prudence, as elaborated by Kimball (1990).  
In the case of either approach, the approximated estimable equation becomes 
 
(4)         it it it it v f X C + + = + ) ( ˆ
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where X includes the determinants of household tastes, f(•) is an increasing function that takes 
zero if λ becomes 0, and  it v  indicates a well-behaved stochastic error term.  In order to control 
for the changes in preferences and household characteristics, such items as household size, age   9
of the respondent, and age squared were included in X (Zeldes, 1989).  Further, in the second 
approach, X includes the squared consumption growth rate.  In consumption growth equation 
(3), it is natural to regard that the squared consumption growth and error terms as being 
correlated.  Thus, we follow Dynan (1993) and treat the squared consumption growth term as 
an endogenous variable.  
Now, let C* represent the optimal consumption in the absence of a current credit 
constraint.  C* = C if the credit constraint is not binding, and C* > C if the credit constraint is 
binding.  Then, we define the gap between optimal consumption under the perfect credit 
accessibility and cash in hand without credit constraints, i.e., H = C* – (A + y + z).  Further, 
following Hayashi (1985) and Jappelli (1990), we assume that the conditional expectation of 
optimal consumption C* can be approximated by a quadratic function.  Hence, the reduced 
form of the optimal consumption C* can be expressed as a linear function of observables, such 
as current income, wealth, and age, as well as the quadratic terms of these variables.  The 
maximum amount of borrowing is also assumed to be a linear function of the same variables.  
Accordingly, we have a reduced-form equation  
 
(5)                 it W it it W H ε β + = ,  
 
where W includes the assets, income, and determinants of optimal consumption and maximum 
loan values, and ε is an error term that captures unobserved elements and measurement error.
5 
                                                 
5 Here, two factors determine whether or not the constraint is binding (Jappelli, 1990).  The 
first factor is the demand for credit, represented by the difference between the cash in hand and 
consumption, while the second factor is the number of financial intermediaries that are willing 
to offer credit to this individual, denoted by z.    10
From equations (4) and (5), we can derive the following econometric model of the 
augmented Euler equation with the following endogenous credit constraints: 
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3.1 Exogenous versus Endogenous Credit Constraints 
The conventional empirical approach to estimate equation (6) (Zeldes, 1989; Morduch, 
1990) ignores the endogeneity of the Lagrange multiplier and exogenously splits the sample 
into those households that are likely to be credit-constrained, i.e., λt > 0, and those are not 
likely to be credit-constrained, i.e., λt = 0, by using observable household characteristics.   
Zeldes (1989) splits the sample based on the wealth-to-income ratio.  
The exogenous split approach, however, has two problems (Garcia, Lusardi, and Ng, 
1997, p. 158; Hu and Schiantarelli, 1998, p. 466–467).  First, it is unlikely that a single variable, 
such as the wealth-to-income ratio, would serve as a sufficient statistic of a consumer’s ability 
to borrow.  Usually, lenders screen credit applicants based on multiple factors.  Second, if the 
variables used as the criteria for splitting a sample were correlated with the unobserved factors 
in consumption growth, this correlation would generate a sample selection problem.   
Accordingly, sample selection bias should be controlled for properly.  
 
3.2 Type 5 Tobit Model with Observed Regimes 
In order to overcome these two issues, an alternative approach elaborated by Jappelli 
(1990) is adopted; this approach constructs a qualitative response model of an endogenous   11
credit constraint by defining the indicator variable of a credit constraint, which would take the 
value of one if the credit constraints are binding, and zero otherwise.  Jappelli, Pischeke, and 
Souleles (1998) combined this model of endogenous credit constraint with a consumption 
Euler equation.  Accordingly, in order to estimate a system of equations (6), we can combine 
the endogenous credit constraint approach of Jappelli (1990) with the augmented Euler 
equation. 
Let the function of the Lagrange multiplier f(λ) be a piecewise linear function of a set 
of variables Z with a coefficient vector ψ that is specific to the credit constraint status.  With 
subscripts N and C representing the credit non-constrained and constrained groups, respectively, 
the estimable augmented Euler equation (6) can be rewritten as follows: 
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The testable restriction of our framework is that the elements of the coefficient vector for the 
non-constrained group in equation (7), i.e., ψN, are all zero.  We assume that errors follow a 
joint normal distribution with zero means and the following covariance matrix: 
 













































If the sign of H is observable, the model can be estimated by the Type 5 Tobit model with 
observed regime (Amemiya 1995, p. 399–408).  The Type 5 Tobit model explicitly considers   12
the endogenous sample selection bias arising from the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
estimation of equation (7).  We can consistently estimate the parameters in the Euler and 
credit-constrained equations by maximizing the following log-likelihood function:   
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where φ(•) and Φ(•) represent the density and cumulative distribution functions of standard 
normal distribution, respectively.  We take the OLS estimation results as the starting values and 
set the auxiliary parameters (σ, σvε) to be (1, 0) initially.  The estimated parameters are then 
employed as the updated initial values to re-estimate all the parameters.
6   
 
                                                 
6 Alternatively, we can estimate the Type 5 Tobit model of equations (7) and (8) by using the 
Heckman and Lee’s two-step procedure.  See, for example, Nawata and Nagase (1996) and 
Nawata (2004). 
   13
3.3 Type 5 Tobit Model with Unobserved Regimes I 
However, a precise measurement of the credit constraint is not straightforward.  A 
direct approach involves utilizing the information on a household’s willingness and ability to 
obtain credit (Jappelli, 1990; Jappelli, Pischeke, and Souleles, 1998).  Generally, household-
level data on credit availability is not available in standard household surveys (Scott, 2000) 
because the credit constraint status cannot be identified by only considering the amount of 
attained credit.  Even in cases where the indicator variable for the credit constraint is not 
observed, we can apply the estimation method of a switching model with unknown regimes.  
Following a recent study by Garcia, Lusardi, and Ng (1997), we estimate the Euler equation 
augmented by endogenous credit constraints as a switching regression model.  Although we 
cannot observe H directly, we can estimate the probability of being credit-constrained jointly 






























































































































































While the nonlinearity of the system made convergence difficult, we achieved interior 
solutions from the OLS starting values and the random attempts that were made to ascertain 
better feasible initial values.  We again set auxiliary parameters (σ, σvε) as (1, 0) initially.  In 
order to re-estimate all the parameters, we employ the estimated parameters as the initial values.  
According to the testable restriction derived from the theoretical result of augmented 
Euler equation (1), for the non-constrained group, the elements of the coefficient vector, i.e.,   14
ψN, are all zero, while, for the constrained group, the elements of the coefficient vector, i.e.,ψC, 
are non-zero.   
 
3.4 Type 5 Tobit Model with Unobserved Regimes II 
  We also estimate the augmented Euler equation with unobserved regimes by letting the 
parameter vector βX differ depending on the regime.  In this case, we have the following 
econometric model which was employed by Garcia et al. (1997) and Kang and Sawada (2007):   
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As earlier, the testable restriction of our framework is that the elements of the coefficient 
vector in equation (12), i.e., ψN, are all zero for the non-constrained group.  We assume that 
errors follow a joint normal distribution with zero means and the following covariance matrix: 
 

































































For identification, we assume that σε
2
  = 1.  In addition, note that σNC and σCN are not 
identifiable because only one of the two regimes can be observed.  All other parameters can be 
identified.   15
Although we cannot observe H directly, we can estimate the probability of being credit-
constrained jointly with other parameters in Euler equations by maximizing the following log-



























































































































































4.  Data and Estimation Results 
 
This paper uses the Japanese Panel Survey of Consumers data set from 1993 to 1999, 
which was collected by the Institute for Research on Household Economics.  The survey was 
conducted in all Japanese prefectures.  The data comprised the responses to multipurpose 
surveys with household and individual modules.  The initial survey in 1993 was completed by 
1,500 women between the ages of 24 and 35.  After excluding the observations with missing 
information, we constructed a balanced panel data set that comprised the survey responses of 
807 women.  The definitions and summary statistics of the variables are provided in Table 1.  
 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 summarizes the descriptive statistics of the variables used in this paper.   
Household income is calculated as the total family income before tax minus the asset income 
such as the returns from securities.  The income is then deflated by the consumer price index.  
The surveys asked about detailed income components in the calendar year immediately before 
the interview.  By following Zeldes (1989, p. 326), we utilize this initial income variable as the   16
only element of Z when we implement econometric analysis.  This also mitigates the 
endogeneity bias arising from the correlation between the initial income and the error term.  
According to Table 1, real household income constantly increased from 4.8 million yen in 1993 
to 6 million yen in 1998; however, it stayed almost unchanged in 1999.  
With respect to total expenditure, questions were asked about the family expenditure in 
the month of September each year.  We multiplied this expenditure figure by 12 and deflated it 
by the consumer price index.  Real annual household expenditure also increased from 1.74 
million yen in 1993 to 2.17 million yen in 1999. 
The household asset variable is obtained as the total amount of deposits, bonds, and 
securities owned by the family.  It increased from 2.84 million yen in 1993 to 4.22 million yen 
in 1999.  The amount of outstanding debt is equal to the sum of housing and other loans.  It 
increased sharply from 3.11 million yen in 1993 to 7.56 million yen in 1999.  This may be due 
to life cycle effects—the respondents were at an early stage of their lives, and thus they were 
likely to accumulate debts to finance housing and other investments.  In fact, the housing 
ownership rate is very high.  Initially, the rate was 60% in 1993, which increased to almost 
70% in 1999.  Note, however, that this increase in debt does not necessarily imply that credit 
constraints are less binding, since the demand for credit might have increased significantly at 
the same time. 
In order to characterize the respondents further, we included marital status and 
education variables.  While approximately 27% of the surveyed women were single in 1993, 
17% remained single in 1999.  With respect to the education level in the sample, 43% of the 
respondents were senior high school graduates; 19%, vocational school graduates; 20%, junior 
college graduates; and 12%, college or university graduates.  
Finally, city size was categorized into three groups, i.e., the major cities with more than 
0.5 million people, other middle- or small-sized cities, and other areas such as towns and   17
villages.  It is notable that approximately 25% and 60% of the respondents were living in major 
and middle-sized cities, respectively.  
 
4.2 Variables Used in the Analysis 
Throughout the estimation of consumption Euler equations, we consider the annual 
growth rate of total expenditures as a dependent variable.
7  Independent variables include the 
respondent’s age and age squared, co-residence dummy, the first difference of the household 
size, and initial household income with a slope dummy variable for credit-constrained and non-
constrained households.  The co-residence dummy variable is exclusively for single women; 
this takes the value of one if a single woman lives with others.  In the final specification based 
on equation (3), we follow Dynan (1993) and Lee and Sawada (2007) and include the squared 
consumption growth rate, treating this variable as endogenous.  
With respect to the credit constraint equation, the explanatory variables are as follows: 
household income, household income squared, asset, asset squared, debt, debt squared, age, 
age squared, marital status, household size, and the education and indicator variables for city 
size.  We also include the co-residence dummy for single women.  Following Jappelli’s probit 
analysis of the credit constraint equation (1990), the dependent variable should be a credit 
constraint dummy that takes the value of one if the credit constraint is binding, and zero 
otherwise.  Notably, the 1993 survey includes a special section that precisely measures credit 
constraint by directly asking about a household’s willingness and ability to obtain credit.  In 
our sample, the percentage of the households facing credit constraint is approximately 8% in 
1993 (Table 1).  
  
 
                                                 
7 This variable is computed by taking the first difference of log real household expenditure.     18
4.3 Estimation Results I: The Case of Observed Regimes 
By using the 1993 survey in which the credit constraints can be identified directly from 
the data set, we summarize the estimation results of Euler equation (7), credit-constrained 
equation (8), and the econometric model that maximizes the likelihood function in equation 
(10).  
Table 2 reports the key empirical findings of the estimated Euler equation (7) by using 
OLS.  Although the coefficients on the initial income for the constrained and non-constrained 
groups are both negative, they are not statistically significant.  
The estimation results of credit-constrained equation (8) are summarized in Table 3.  
According to this table, the probability of binding credit constraints is a positive function of 
debt; however, the ownership of a house significantly decreases the probability.  These results 
imply that loan provisions are positively affected by the net amount of assets that can be used 
as collateral.  Further, we also found that the respondents with higher education tended to have 
a lower probability of being credit-constrained; this confirmed the finding of Horioka and 
Kohara (1999). 
Table 4 shows the estimation results of augmented Euler equation (7) under observable 
but endogenous credit constraints (8), achieved by maximizing the likelihood function in 
equation (10).  In the Euler equation section, we find that the income coefficient for credit-
constrained households is negative and statistically significant at 10%, while the coefficient for 
non-constrained households is not statistically different from zero.  The result confirms our 
hypothesis that the source of violation of the standard LC-PIH is the binding credit constraint. 
  These results are consistent with the theory of consumption smoothing under 
endogenous credit constraints.  With regard to the credit constraint equation, as observed in 
Table 4, the amount of outstanding debt and house ownership affects the probability of binding 
credit constraints positively and negatively, respectively.  The dummy variables for higher 
education also significantly affect the probability.   19
 
4.4 Estimation Results II: The Case of Unobserved Regimes 
We present the second set of estimation results using the full sample from 1993 to 1999.  
This part comprises two subparts.  First, we estimate an econometric model of augmented 
Euler equation (7) under unobservable credit-constraint indicators by maximizing the 
likelihood function in equation (11).  Second, we estimate the augmented Euler equation by 
relaxing the assumption of the same coefficients across regimes.  In this approach, we estimate 
equations (12), (13), and (14) jointly by maximizing the likelihood function in equation (16) 
under the distributional assumption in equation (15).
8   
In Table 5, we represent the estimation results of the augmented Euler equation under 
unobservable but endogenous credit constraints, achieved by maximizing the likelihood 
function in equation (11).  In other words, we estimate the model of equations (12), (13), and 
(14) under constraints βN = βC and vN = vC = v.  In the Euler equation section, we find that the 
income coefficients for credit-constrained and non-constrained households are negative and 
positive, respectively.  The direction and statistical significance of the former coefficient is 
consistent with the theory of consumption smoothing under endogenous credit constraints.  The 
estimation results of the credit constraint equation are summarized in the lower section of 
Table 5.  While none of the individual coefficients are statistically significant, they are jointly 
significant at the 10% level.  
                                                 
8 We also follow Zeldes’ exogenous grouping approach (1989) and split the households based 
on the wealth-to-income ratio.  A household is regarded as being credit-constrained if the 
calculated total non-housing wealth is less than two months’ worth of the average income.  The 
coefficients on the initial income for the constrained and non-constrained groups are negative 
as well as marginally significant.  The level of statistical significance is slightly larger for the 
credit-constrained households.    20
Table 6 summarizes the estimation results of equations (12), (13), and (14) jointly by 
maximizing the likelihood function in equation (16).  The qualitative findings in Table 6 are 
similar to those in Table 5 even after relaxing the same coefficients on Euler equations, while 
the t-value of the income coefficient for the constrained group is a mere 1.34.  Thus, the results 
only marginally support the theory.  Interestingly, in the credit constraint equation, the 
coefficient on the year dummy variable for 1998 takes a large positive value and is statistically 
significant.  This implies that the seriousness of the credit crunch at the household level had 
increased in 1998.  Moreover, the estimated covariance of the error terms in (13) and (14) is 
positive and statistically significant, suggesting that the endogeneity bias generated by credit 
constraints is not negligible.   
 
4.5 Probability of Binding Credit Constraints 
In order to further compare credit accessibility across the years, we computed the 
probability of binding credit constraints ( ) W it W β ˆ Φ  by using the estimated parameter vectors 
shown in Tables 4 and 6.  Note that the joint Wald test results, where all the coefficients in the 
credit constraint equation are zero, support the validity of these estimated coefficients.
9   
Figures 2 and 3 represent the kernel density functions of the predicted credit-
constrained probabilities using the switching regression results for 1993–1994 and 1993–1998, 
respectively.  We employed a Gaussian kernel to estimate the density functions.  The band 
width of the density function is selected such that the mean integrated square error is 
minimized.  In both these figures, the distribution of credit-constrained households in 1993 is 
skewed toward the left in a similar manner, indicating that only a small portion of households 
face credit constraints.  Note that the density function in Figure 2 is reliable because it is based 
                                                 
9 The Wald test statistics are 78.39 with a p-value of 0.000 and 124.37 with a p-value of 0.000 
for the results in Tables 4 and 6, respectively.    21
on direct credit constraint information.  The similarity in the density functions for 1993 in 
Figures 2 and 3 suggests the validity of the results of the unobserved credit constraint model 
reported in Figure 3.  In addition, as Figure 3 reveals, the density function moves slightly 
toward the right over time, indicating that the probability of binding credit constraints has 
increased.  The two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests of the equality of distributions reject 
the equality between the pairs of the three probability distributions of binding credit constraints 
in 1993, 1995, and 1998 at the 5% level of statistical significance.  These findings may imply 
that the credit crunch generated negative effects on the households’ consumption smoothing 
behavior especially at the end of the 1990s.   
However, the median (average) probabilities of binding credit constraint in 1993, 1995, 
and 1998 are merely 8.88% (13.80%), 10.69% (14.88%), and 10.79% (13.83%), respectively.  
Hence, the negative welfare effects of credit crunch on household welfare may be negligible.  
Figure 4 further compares the three density functions by using the cumulative density functions 
of the predicted probabilities of binding credit constraints.  By looking at Figure 4, we can 
perform an eye-ball test of the stochastic dominance; we ascertain that the second-order 
stochastic dominance holds.  Initially, in 1993, for the relatively less credit-constrained group, 
the probability of binding credit constraints appears to have increased significantly.  However, 
it is not necessarily obvious that the predicted probabilities in 1993 are dominated by the 
probabilities in 1995 that, in turn, are dominated by the probabilities in 1998.  In fact, based on 
the Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests, we cannot reject the same distribution if we take the 1% level 
of significance; this supports our result that credit crunch generated a rather minor effect on 
household welfare. 
 
4.6 Estimation Results III: Household Prudence 
While these overall empirical results are in accordance with our theoretical framework, 
the level of statistical significance in Table 6 is not necessarily supportive of our theoretical   22
framework.  In order to improve the accuracy of our estimation, we employ an alternative 
estimation strategy based on equation (3).  By doing so, we can also estimate the prudence 
parameter that summarizes the degree of precautionary saving.  
We employ Type 5 Tobit model with unobserved regimes as before by including a new 
independent variable—squared consumption growth rate.  However, an additional issue that we 
consider here is an endogeneity bias arising from a correlation between the error term of the 
Euler equation and the squared consumption growth rate on the right-hand side of equation (3) 
(Dynan, 1993).  Specifically, we postulate a linear regression equation for the squared 
consumption growth rate.  Assuming that the error terms of the squared consumption growth 
rate and the consumption growth rate equation follow a bivariate normal distribution, we can 
employ the two-stage method suggested by Smith and Blundell (1986) to control for the 
endogeneity bias (Lee and Sawada, 2005).  
In the first step, we regress the squared consumption growth rate on a set of 
instrumental variables including marriage status, co-residence status, education variables, the 
number of household members, household ownership information, asset variables, and debt 
variables.  While the adjusted R-squared is small (0.005), implying that the instruments explain 
only a small portion of the variation in consumption, we reject the hypothesis that the 
coefficients of the instruments are jointly equal to zero in the first stage at the 1% level.  These 
figures are comparable to those in previous studies, including Dynan (1993).  In the second 
stage, we follow Smith and Blundell (1986) and include the residual from the first-stage 
regression to control for endogeneity bias.  We then estimate augmented Euler equation (7) 
under unobservable credit constraint indicators given in equation (8) by maximizing the 
likelihood function in equation (11).  
Table 7 shows the estimation results.  Specification (1) represents the replication 
specification shown by Dynan (1993).  It confirms the small prudence puzzle because the 
coefficient of squared consumption growth rate is not statistically different from zero.  The   23
prudence estimates continue to be indistinguishable from zero (Specifications (2) and (3)) even 
when income is included.  We also use the system of equations (7) and (8) by allowing 
different coefficients for the Euler equation parameters except the constant term.
10  If we split 
the sample endogenously, we find that income coefficients are negative and statistically 
significant for the credit-constrained households but insignificant for the non-constrained 
households (Specification (4)).  In addition, the constrained households have stronger 
precautionary saving motives: They behave more prudently than the non-constrained ones.  
The degree of prudence for the constrained households (0.15 × 2 = 0.3) is larger than that in 
Dynan (ranging from 0.14 to 0.166).  However, our estimates may still be smaller than the 
expected size of the prudence that ranges from 2 to 5 (Dynan, 1993; Lee and Sawada, 2007).  
The remaining gap may be related to the approximation bias, as argued by Ludvigson and 
Paxson (2001), and the concavity of the consumption function, as discussed by Carroll (2001) 
and Carroll and Kimball (2006).  
 
4.7 Supply- or Demand-Driven Crunch? 
In order to identify whether the credit crunch was driven by supply or demand, we also 
estimate the prudence parameters for different phases.  Specifically, we allow the prudence 
parameter to be different before and during the period from 1996 to 1998.
11  The result is 
reported in Specification (5) in Table 7.  For the credit-constrained group, the prudence 
                                                 
10 We also tried to estimate the augmented Euler equation by jointly relaxing the assumption of 
the same coefficients across regimes, i.e., across equations (12), (13), and (14), by maximizing 
the likelihood function in equation (16) under the distributional assumption in equation (15).  
However, we failed to achieve convergence in this model.  
11 We attempted to differentiate the period from 1997 to 1998 but could not achieve 
convergence of the likelihood function.    24
parameter is slightly smaller for the latter period.  Our estimates may be regarded as being 
consistent with those of Hori and Shimizutani (2006), who found that the prudence parameter 
had dropped in the period from 1997 to 1998.  
If the prudence parameter increases, precautionary saving should increase and the 
optimal consumption level should decline; in such a case, precautionary saving is likely to act 
as a self-imposed credit constraint, as discussed in Deaton (1992).  Thus, such a scenario is 
expected to present a demand-driven credit crunch.  In contrast, our result shows that 
precautionary saving declines and optimal consumption level increases.  This result implies 
that the credit crunch in 1997 was more likely to be supply-driven than demand-driven.   
 
5.  Conclusions 
 
In this study, we investigated the manner in which households in Japan were affected 
by the credit crunch.  Several important empirical findings emerged.  First, we found that a 
small but a non-zero portion of people face credit constraints.  Accordingly, our results reject 
the standard consumption Euler equation, i.e., the necessary condition of the life cycle 
permanent income hypothesis.  The maximum likelihood estimation results support our 
framework of the Euler equation with endogenous credit constraints.  Finally, analyses of the 
full data for the period from 1993 to 1999 indicate that the credit crunch became particularly 
more prevalent at the household level after 1997.  However, the overall negative impact of 
credit crunch may not be severe.  
When market or non-market opportunities for risk sharing are limited, credit serves as 
an insurance substitute.  In the event of negative transitory shocks to their income, households 
can obtain credit instead of receiving an insurance payment; this helps the households to 
smooth out such shocks.  To a small group of marginally non-constrained households, the 
financial crunch in Japan appears to have disabled the role of credit as an important self-  25
insurance device.  However, our results suggest that the overall impact of the credit crunch on 
households was not significant.  Our study suggests that unlike the Great Depression in the US 
in 1930 wherein consumer spending collapsed, thereby turning a minor recession into a serious 
depression (Olney, 1999), the credit crunch in Japan was unlikely to have magnified the 
negative macroeconomic shocks in 1997.  In fact, a closer look at Figure 1 reveals that the 
number of people who filed for personal bankruptcies was less than a mere 0.01% of the total 
population in Japan until 1998.  
While our results suggest that the credit crunch in Japan was supply-driven, the 
household-level impact might have been very small.  Having stated this, we need to further 
investigate the robustness of our results based on household-level data in the context of 
Japanese economy in the 1990s.  This line of research should provide imperative policy 
implications for any future credit crunch.    26
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Credit constraint dummy for 1993 based on Jappelli 
(1990) (= 1, if constrained; = 0, otherwise) 
Const  0.08          
Household ownership dummy  (= 1, if own house; = 0, 
otherwise) 
ownhouse 0.60  0.62  0.63  0.63 0.66 0.67 0.69 
Single dummy (= 1, if single; = 0, otherwise)  Single 0.27  0.23  0.21  0.19 0.18 0.17 0.16 
Co-residence dummy for single women (= 1, if living with 
other(s); = 0, otherwise) 
Cores  0.25  0.22  0.20  0.16 0.15 0.14 0.13 
Education level dummy  (= 1, if senior high school 
graduate; = 0, otherwise) 
edu2  0.43  0.43  0.43  0.43 0.43 0.43 0.43 
Education level dummy (= 1, if vocational school 
graduate; = 0, otherwise) 
edu3  0.19  0.19  0.19  0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 
Education level dummy  (= 1, if junior college graduate; = 
0, otherwise) 
edu4  0.20  0.20  0.20  0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 
Education level dummy  (= 1, if university graduate; = 0, 
otherwise) 
edu5  0.12  0.12  0.12  0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 
Major city dummy (= 1, if major city; = 0, otherwise) Bigcity  0.24  0.23  0.23  0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 
Other cities dummy (= 1, if other cities; = 0, otherwise)  City  0.59  0.59  0.59  0.58  0.58  0.58  0.58 
              
Sample  size    807 807 807 807  807  807 791* 
* Between 1998 and 1999, 16 households dropped from the survey.  
Table 2. Exogenous Credit Constraints Test Estimation Results of the Euler Equation Dependent 
Variable: Growth Rate of Expenditure between 1993 and 1994 
 
      
   Coef.  Std.  Err. 
      
Single dummy (= 1, if 
single; = 0, otherwise) 
single –0.063  (0.061) 
Co-residence dummy for 
single women (= 1, if living 
with other(s); = 0, otherwise)
cores 0.066  (0.075) 
Age of the respondent  age  –0.238  (0.100)** 
Age squared  age2  0.004  (0.002)** 
First difference of the 
household size 
dsize –0.027  (0.026)+ 
Log income for credit-
constrained households 
ln_y_cc –0.025  (0.017)++ 
Log income for non-
constrained households 
ln_y_nc –0.021  (0.014) 
Constant 
 
_cons 3.705  (1.466)** 
      
Sample size 
 
 807   
Note) Standard errors are indicated in parentheses.  ** indicates significance at the 5% 
level.  + and ++ indicate that their p-values are 0.149 and 0.115, respectively.   34
 
Table 3. 
Estimation Results of the Probit of Credit Constraint Equation Dependent Variable: Discrete 
Variable of Credit Constraints in 1993 
   Coef.  Std.  Err. 
      
Single dummy (= 1, if single; = 0, otherwise)  single  0.324  (0.459) 
Co-residence dummy for single women (= 1, if 
living with other(s); = 0, otherwise) 
cores –0.292  (0.454) 
Number of household members  hnum  0.038  (0.055) 
Annual household income (1993 price, in log)  ln_y  0.201  (0.251) 
Log income squared  ln_y2  –0.030  (0.036) 
Household assets (total amount of deposits plus 
total amount of securities) (1993 price, in log) 
ln_ast 0.040  (0.108) 
Log asset squared  ln_ast2  –0.025  (0.018) 
Amount of outstanding debt (1993 price, in log)  ln_debt  0.215  (0.089)** 
Amount of outstanding debt squared (1993 price, 
log value squared) 
ln_debt2 –0.017  (0.012) 
Household ownership dummy (= 1, if own house; 
= 0, otherwise) 
ownhouse –0.315 (0.179)* 
Age of the respondent  age  –0.180  (0.424) 
Age squared  age2  0.003  (0.007) 
Education level dummy (= 1, if senior high school 
graduate; = 0, otherwise)  
edu2 –0.381  (0.235) 
Education level dummy (= 1, if vocational school 
graduate; = 0, otherwise)  
edu3 –0.391  (0.277) 
Education level dummy (= 1, if junior college 
graduate; = 0, otherwise)  
edu4 –0.534  (0.284)** 
Education level dummy (= 1 if university graduate; 
= 0 otherwise)  
edu5 –1.040  (0.445)***
Major city dummy (= 1, if major city; = 0, 
otherwise) 
bigcity 0.227  (0.235) 
Other cities dummy (= 1, if other cities; = 0, 
otherwise) 
city –0.029  (0.205) 
Constant _cons  1.302  (6.090) 
      
Sample size    807   
      
Note) Standard errors are indicated in parentheses.  *** indicates significance at the 1% level; 
**, at the 5% level; and *, at the 10% level. 
   35
Table 4. Estimation Results of the Augmented Euler Equation Dependent Variable: Growth Rate of 
Expenditure between 1993 and 1994 
   Coef.  Std.  Err. 
Euler equation 
 
    
Single dummy (= 1, if single; = 0, otherwise)  single  –0.055  (0.059) 
Co-residence dummy for single women (= 1, if living with 
other(s); = 0, otherwise) 
cores 0.055  (0.082) 
Age of the respondent  age  –0.242  (0.100)** 
Age squared  age2  0.004  (0.002)** 
First difference of the household size  dsize  –0.028  (0.026) 
Log income for credit-constrained households  ln_y_cc  –0.034  (0.018)* 
Log income for non-constrained households  ln_y_nc  –0.021  (0.014) 
Constant _cons  3.765  (1.459) 
      
Credit constraint equation 
 
    
Single dummy (= 1, if single; = 0, otherwise)  single  0.319  (0.456) 
Co-residence dummy for single women (= 1, if living with 
other(s); = 0, otherwise) 
cores –0.291  (0.454) 
Number of household members  hnum  0.030  (0.056) 
Annual household income (1993 price, in log)  ln_y  0.187  (0.254) 
Log income squared  ln_y2  –0.027  (0.036) 
Household assets (total amount of deposits plus total 
amount of securities) (1993 price, in log) 
ln_ast 0.046  (0.109) 
Log asset squared  ln_ast2  –0.026  (0.018) 
Amount of outstanding debt (1993 price, in log)  ln_debt  0.214  (0.089)** 
Amount of outstanding debt squared (1993 price, log value 
squared) 
ln_debt2 –0.017  (0.012) 
Household ownership dummy (= 1, if own house; = 0, 
otherwise) 
ownhouse –0.303 (0.180)* 
Age of the respondent  age  –0.165  (0.429) 
Age squared  age2  0.003  (0.007) 
Education level dummy (= 1, if senior high school 
graduate; = 0, otherwise)  
edu2 –0.392  (0.234)* 
Education level dummy (= 1, if vocational school graduate; 
= 0, otherwise)  
edu3 –0.409  (0.278) 
Education level dummy (= 1, if junior college graduate; = 
0, otherwise)  
edu4 –0.552  (0.289)* 
Education level dummy (= 1, if university graduate; = 0, 
otherwise)  
edu5 –1.058  (0.441)** 
Major city dummy (= 1, if major city; = 0, otherwise)  bigcity  0.232  (0.236) 
Other cities dummy (= 1, if other cities; = 0, otherwise)  city  0.016  (0.213) 
Constant _cons  1.147  (6.151) 
Other parameters      
σv
2 _cons  0.497  (0.048)***









Note) Standard errors are indicated in parentheses.  *** indicates significance at the 1% level; **, at 
the 5% level; and *, at the 10% level.   36
Table 5. Estimation Results of the Augmented Euler Equation Dependent Variable: Annual Growth 
Rate of Expenditure between 1993 and 1999 
   Coef.  Std.  Err. 
Euler equation      
Single dummy (= 1, if single; = 0, otherwise)  single  0.049  (0.053)  
Co-residence dummy for single women (= 1, if living with 
other(s); = 0, otherwise) 
cores 0.060  (0.079)   
Age of the respondent  age  –0.052  (0.060)  
Age squared  age2  0.001  (0.001)  
First difference of the household size  dsize  –0.015  (0.012)  
Log income for credit-constrained households  ln_y_cc  –0.067  (0.012)*** 
Log income for non-constrained households  ln_y_nc  0.034  (0.012)*** 
Constant _cons  0.954  (0.967)   
      
Credit constraint equation     
Single dummy (= 1, if single; = 0, otherwise)  single  0.098  (0.131)  
Co-residence dummy for single women (= 1, if living with 
other(s); = 0, otherwise) 
cores 0.185  (0.206)   
Number of household members  hnum  –0.002  (0.015)  
Annual household income (1993 price, in log)  ln_y  0.278  (0.368)  
Log income squared  ln_y2  –0.022  (0.034)  
Household assets (total amount of deposits plus total 
amount of securities) (1993 price, in log) 
ln_ast –0.019  (0.046)   
Log asset squared  ln_ast2  0.002  (0.006)  
Amount of outstanding debt (1993 price, in log)  ln_debt  –0.020  (0.026)  
Amount of outstanding debt squared (1993 price, log value 
squared) 
ln_debt2 0.002  (0.004)   
Household ownership dummy (= 1, if own house; = 0, 
otherwise) 
ownhouse 0.018 (0.039)   
Age of the respondent  age  –0.036  (0.166)  
Age squared  age2  0.001  (0.003)  
Education level dummy (= 1, if senior high school 
graduate; = 0, otherwise)  
edu2 –0.016  (0.096)   
Education level dummy (= 1, if  vocational school 
graduate; = 0, otherwise)  
edu3 –0.056  (0.104)   
Education level dummy (= 1, if   junior college graduate; = 
0, otherwise)  
edu4 –0.029  (0.086)   
Education level dummy  (= 1, if university graduate; = 0, 
otherwise)  
edu5 –0.086  (0.104)   
Year dummy for 1994 (= 1, if 1994; = 0, otherwise)  D94  –0.045  (0.058)  
Year dummy for 1995 (= 1, if 1995; = 0, otherwise)  D95  0.034  (0.054)  
Year dummy for 1996 (= 1, if 1996; = 0, otherwise)  D96  0.047  (0.069)  
Year dummy for 1997 (= 1, if 1997; = 0, otherwise)  D97  –0.099  (0.063)  
Year dummy for 1998 (= 1, if 1998; = 0, otherwise)  D98  –0.046  (0.073)  
Major city dummy (= 1, if major city; = 0 otherwise)  bigcity  –0.046  (0.053)  
Other cities dummy (= 1, if other cities; = 0, otherwise)  city  –0.031  (0.051)  
Constant _cons  –0.255  (2.660) 
Other parameters     
σv
2 _cons  0.706  (0.028  )***
σvε _cons  0.701  (0.028)*:* 
 
Sample size 
 4842   
Note) Standard errors are indicated in parentheses.  *** indicates significance at the 1% level; **, at 
the 5% level; and *, at the 10% level.   37
Table 6. Estimation Results of the Augmented Euler Equation Dependent Variable: Annual Growth 
Rate of Expenditure between 1993 and 1999 
    Non-Constrained. Constrained 
Euler equation    Coef. Std. Err.  Coef. Std. Err.
Single dummy (= 1, if single; = 0, otherwise) single  0.019  (0.031)    0.162  (0.546) 
Co-residence dummy for single women (= 1, if living 
with other(s); = 0, otherwise) 
cores  –0.005 (0.039)    0.511 (0.826) 
Age of the respondent  age  –0.021 (0.031)    –0.267 (0.235) 
Age squared  age2  0.0003 (0.0004)  0.004 (0.004) 
First difference of the household size  dsize  –0.009 (0.015)    –0.014 (0.091) 
Log income   ln_y  –0.006 (0.009)    –0.073 (0.054)
+ 
Constant _cons  0.433 (0.492)    3.406 (3.412) 
Credit constraint equation      
Single dummy (= 1, if single; = 0, otherwise)  single  –0.840 (0.504)*     
Co-residence dummy for single women (= 1, if living 
with other(s); = 0, otherwise) 
cores  1.709 (0.496)***   
Number of household members  hnum  –0.033  (0.044)    
Annual household income (1993 price, in log)  ln_y  –0.257  (0.133)**    
Log income squared  ln_y2  0.035  (0.018)**    
Household assets (total amount of deposits plus total 
amount of securities) (1993 price, in log) 
ln_ast 0.010  (0.057)     
Log asset squared  ln_ast2  –0.006  (0.008)    
Amount of outstanding debt (1993 price, in log)  ln_debt  0.043  (0.048)    
Amount of outstanding debt squared (1993 price, log 
value squared) 
ln_debt2 –0.009 (0.008)   
Household ownership dummy (= 1, if own house; = 0, 
otherwise) 
ownhouse 0.023 (0.121)     
Age of the respondent  age  –0.225  (0.189)    
Age squared  age2  0.003  (0.003)    
Education level dummy (= 1 if senior high school 
graduate; = 0, otherwise)  
edu2 –0.070  (0.167)     
Education level dummy (= 1 if vocational school 
graduate; = 0, otherwise)  
edu3 –0.103  (0.186)     
Education level dummy (= 1 if junior college graduate; = 
0, otherwise)  
edu4 –0.217  (0.203)     
Education level dummy (=1 if university graduate; = 0, 
otherwise)  
edu5 –0.236  (0.231)     
Year dummy for 1994 (= 1, if 1994; = 0, otherwise)  D94  0.220  (0.124)*    
Year dummy for 1995 (= 1, if 1995; = 0, otherwise)  D95  0.259  (0.140)*    
Year dummy for 1996 (= 1, if 1996; = 0, otherwise)  D96  0.176  (0.140)    
Year dummy for 1997 (= 1, if 1997; = 0, otherwise)  D97  0.199  (0.174)    
Year dummy for 1998 (= 1, if 1998; = 0, otherwise)  D98  0.404  (0.165)**    
Major city dummy (= 1, if major city; = 0, otherwise)  bigcity  –0.351  (0.152)**    
Other cities dummy (= 1, if other cities; = 0, otherwise)  city  –0.245  (0.125)*    
Constant _cons  3.473  (3.104)     
Other parameters      
σN
2 _cons  0.336  (0.020)***   
σε
2 _cons  1.376  (0.372)***     
σNε    0.010 (0.026)     
σCε 
 
  0.921 (0.530)*     
Sample size     4842   
Note) Standard errors are indicated in parentheses.  *** indicates significance at the 1% level; **, at the 
5% level; and *, at the 10% level.  + indicates the p-value of 0.179.Table 7. Estimation Results of the Augmented Euler Equation with the Prudence Term Dependent Variable: Annual Growth Rate of Expenditure 
between 1993 and 1999 
Specification   (1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Method   IV MLE MLE  MLE  MLE 









      Constrained Unconstrained Constrained Unconstrained 
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Residual from the squared consumption 
growth regression 












Log income for credit-constrained 
households 



























            
Credit constraint equation included?   NO  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Over-identification restriction tests based 
on Sargan pseudo-F tests 
 0.667        
Sample size    4842  807  4842  4842  4842 
Note) Standard errors are indicated in parentheses.  *** indicates significance at the 1% level; **, at the 5% level; and *, at the 10% level.  + indicates 
the p-value of 0.179.Figure 1 








































































Data source) The Supreme Court of Japan  40
 
Figure 2 
























0 10 20 30 40 50




   41
 
Figure 3 
Kernel Density Function of Probability of Binding Credit Constraints  
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Figure 4 
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